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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on defining determinants of FDI flows from the
perspective of a host country by creating a balanced panel of 12 countries
from the CEEC and Baltic region. We find FDI flows to move, on average,
to stable exchange rate environments, countries with low sovereign risk, and
countries with high GDP per capita. In addition, we find also that
agglomeration of FDI seems to be an important determinant of current FDI
flows. We do not find any support in the data for trade openness to be
neither a robust nor a significant explanatory variable of current FDI flows.
1 INTRODUCTION
Intensive growth of international financial flows occurred in the late
1980s and in 1990s for several reasons. Firstly, the development of
portfolio theory and institutional investors in U.S. in late 1970s and in
1980s (money market mutual funds, investment funds, pension funds)
emerged as an answer to stiff regulation in the U.S. banking sector.
Secondly, amplified interrelations of global markets and globalisation,
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due to improvements in telecommunications and information
technologies, enabled greater movement of funds across markets.
Thirdly, the liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets in
mid-1980s, especially in European countries, encouraged the
development of financial institutions, markets and instruments in
Europe.
By the end of the 1990s it seems that flows of international financing
have surpassed the flows of international trade and become
independent.
Table 1
TOTAL NET PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1990-99. (in bil. USD)
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Source: World Bank (2000), p. 36.
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The break-down of the socialist-planning concept of managing an
economy, as well as the beginning of transition in most of the former
socialist countries towards market economy, brought additional interest
in FDI as a way to increase efficiency of the existing socially- (or
state)-owned-enterprises (SOEs), narrow the technological gap vis-a-vis
the western-European countries and introduce new skills and new ways
of doing business.
Table 2
FDI FLOWS IN BULGARIA (BUL), CROATIA (CRO), CZECH REPUBLIC (CZK),
ESTONIA (EST), HUNGARY (HUN), LATVIA (LAT), LITHUANIA (LIT),
MACEDONIA (MAK), POLAND (POL), ROMANIA (ROM), SLOVAKIA (SKA)









































































































































































Among the CEEC countries Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
received the lion's part of FDI flows. Focusing on the CEEC and Baltic
transition countries, our goal is to identify the factors, which attract
FDIs. This should answer the question why some of the countries in
transition received more FDI flows compared to others. So far, according
to our knowledge, nobody has undertaken an analysis including all
CEEC countries for the period 1993 -1999.
The paper is, thus, divided into five parts. In the first section we give a
brief background description, then we proceed by specifying the problem
and explaining the utilised variables. Section 4 contains descriptions of
the proxies we applied to model the defined variables. In Section 5 we
interpret the obtained empirical results and compare them with the
results from other papers. We conclude that FDIs are attracted by a
stable exchange rate environment, higher per capita income,
agglomeration of foreign direct investment flows and low sovereign risk.
We do not find support for trade openness to be significant in explaining
FDI flows.
2 BACKGROUND
Foreign direct investments (FDIs)1 can be divided into two main
categories (Julius, 1991): FDIs that produce new assets and a whole new
operation ("greenfield investment"), and merger and acquisition FDIs
("brownfield investment") that aim to improve the efficiency of acquired
unit - where most of the privatisation deals can be classified.
As in every market, we can also define supply and demand side in the
market for FDI. Supply side of the FDI market consists of multinational
corporations (MNCs) that have incentives to invest in a specific country
(host country). To understand the supply side, then, we have to be able
to understand those motives: why MNCs invest in a particular country,
1 By the "Balance of Payments Manual" (IMF, 1993) definition, every foreign
investment in equity that exceeds 10 percent of voting power in an enterprise is
considered as a foreign direct investment.
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why in a particular industry, why in the form of FDI and not in the
form of portfolio investment or credit, etc. Demand side of the FDI
market consists of national governments and other economic units in
the host country that will be sublimed under the national government.2
The demand side story can be understood, if we are able to discover the
motives of national governments to attract FDI versus portfolio
investment or ordinary credit.
Some studies of motives of MNCs for FDI stress technological
externalities, i.e. MNC can lower average fixed costs of capital intensive
industries (an of RAD) by expanding the production via FDI.
Imperfections on the production factors markets can also play a role.
Also, strategic reasons and industrial organisation can provide motives
for FDI - entrance in the foreign market, closeness to the selling market,
surpassing obstacles to foreign trade, etc. All of those partial reasons
have been summarised in the OLI theory of motives for FDI (Dunning,
1988). According to that theory, MNCs will engage in FDI if three
prerequisites are fulfilled: ownership advantages (O), locational
advantages (L), and potential benefits from internalisation (I) .
Ownership advantages represent all the advantages of owning a
producing unit in a host country versus selling the goods and services
in the market or selling the license to some economic unit in the host
country. Locational advantages represent specifics regarding inputs that
exist in a host country (natural resources, infrastructure, abundance and
low price of labour and other inputs, availability of skilled labour, etc.),
transport costs, access to the market, as well as various forms of
administrative specifics (taxes, tariffs, quotas, incentives for FDI etc.).
Internalisation advantages represent the improvements of efficiency, as
well the reduction of costs, when transactions (e.g. common financial
planning, internal credits etc.) are done internally between parent MNC
and the FDI outlet, versus those transactions done through markets
(either in the home country of the MNC or host country).
2 Which would be the same as to suppose that government in its pursuit of
maximizing social welfare function takes into account the specific interest of
potential FDI deals.
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Summary of the motives for the host country to attract FDIs can be in
creating social benefits like: creating jobs, transfer of the technology and
other skills, improving the human capital, broadening of the tax base,
boosting the economic activity, boosting of exports, better integration
to the world markets, realisation of comparative and competitive
advantages, realisation of the scale and scope economies, etc. There are
also potential costs associated with FDIs (Graham and Krugman, 1995):
reduction of "good" jobs and increase of "bad" jobs (due to labour market
imperfections, increases of imports and import dependence - due to
imports of new technology), take-over of strategic industries by
foreigners, influence of big MNCs on policy in a small country,
monopolisation of the industry after the entrance of FDI. Host countries
should try to keep social benefits above social costs. Another motive for
the host country to attract FDIs lays in the fact that FDI are not
debt-creating flows, and a host country can use external financing
through FDI without a fear of growing unsustainable foreign debt (that
logic was behind the debt-equity swap strategies of debt reduction in the
aftermath of debt crisis in the 1980s).
3 PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
In order to define our model we use the Dunning's eclectic OLI model
applying it to total FDI flows to CEEC countries. The concept of
"O"wnership advantages gives rises to the question which reasons lie
behind the company's investment abroad. In this context the distinction
can be made between specific qualities a firm contains representing
entry barriers for other companies (technology, managerial techniques,
company size, monopoly power). The concept of 'T'nternalisation
advantages attempts to answer the question why a specific firm prefers
to invest abroad rather than being involved in licensing, franchising or
some other way of delegating the production other than founding its
own company. Analysing total FDI flows one is facing the fact that a
company has already decided to invest abroad. The interesting question
remains, however, about the main determinants influencing the choice
of location, i.e. "L"ocational advantages of a home country.
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Our model takes into account five broad segments (see equation 1) of
the local (home) country attempting to describe its "L"ocational
advantages.
(1) FDI = f (agglomeration of FDI, macroeconomic stability, market
size/market purchasing power, market trade openness, and economic
and political risk)
- Agglomeration of FDI
The idea of the agglomeration hypothesis is based upon the cluster
effect (Bellack, 1998) caused by FDIs and could also be explained by the
bandwagon effect in the shape of oligopolistic reaction (Vidas-Bubanja,
1998). One could imagine that in not well-established economies, as the
emerging or rather transition economies are, where the economic
environment is rapidly changing, recent history matters compared to
the accumulated effect (in this case cumulative flows of FDI). We expect
a positive sign in front of the flow/stock FDI coefficient.
- Macroeconomic stability
We define macroeconomic stability as price stability in a broad sense.
It can be perceived as a measure of investment value volatility or risk.
The higher the volatility, the higher the investment risk. We also
calculate the nominal exchange rate volatility (as the price of the local
currency with respect to the USD - Barell and Pain, 1997) as deviations
from the average exchange rate over the whole period and, alternatively,
as the standard deviations of the currency among quarters in a given
year. The same standard deviation approach we apply to the inflation
volatility variable. In addition, level of prices in the economy, which is
perceived as a determinant of the locational advantage, is also tested. In
both cases, one would expect negative signs in front of the coefficients,




The market size hypothesis can be viewed from different perspectives.
FDI flows could be seen as a consequence of domestic demand
deficiencies and hence undertaken for broadening the demand basis. In
that sense, firms producing tradable goods may invest abroad to improve
market access by offering improved customer support (instead of being
involved in licensing). In that sense absolute market size (population or
GDP) and actual demand or purchasing power (per capita GDP)
matters. On the other hand market size may be looked at as describing
the dynamic development of market purchasing strength (growth rates
of GDP or per capita GDP). We expect for any of the market size
measures to be positively correlated with FDI inflows.
- Market trade openness
Market trade openness or trade intensity ratio can be seen as an
indicator of the country's trade policy, although it has some
shortcomings. Large countries perform more intraregional trade
compared to the small open economies, which are forced to engage more
in international trade. In our case we deal with CEEC countries, which
can be treated as small open economies. It has been shown that the
level of technology in a country (through FDI) positively depends upon
the degree of integration into world trade. However, there is also
evidence of FDI flows into markets which are highly protected, and
where such firms take usually a monopolistic position3, or engage in
"tariff jumping". In this case either sign could be expected.
3 A good example is the free oil trade between Croatia and Macedonia. After selling
the publicly owned oil refinery OKTA to the Greek company Helenic Petroleum,
Macedonian oil imports from Croatia were cut and OKTA repositioned itself as the
only price setter on the market.
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- Sovereign risk
Credit rating is used to measure investor's perception of country specific
risk. This variable incorporates three factors, which can cause country
risk - political events, economic factors and social factors.4 Since there
is a wide variety of elements, which help define the rating index, we do
not think that collinearity in model with the macrostability variables
represents a problem. Bevan and Estrin (2000) find that credit rating is
significantly and positively correlated with FDI inflows. One would
expect that credit ratings are positively related to FDI inflows.
4 DATA DESCRIPTION AND REGRESSION MODEL
In the presented analysis we do not focus on identified flows (home
country p invests in host county q) as it is undertaken in several other
papers (see e.g. Bevan and Estrin, 2000,- Resmini, 2000), but rather take
into account total FDI flows to transition countries. Furthermore, panel
comprises 12 countries, including CEEC and Baltic countries for which
data is available on an annual frequency from 1990 to 1999. The latter
represents the reason underlying the exclusion of Albania and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The panel definition embodies one of the differences
between our paper and the recently published work by Bevan and Estrin
(2000) since they excluded Croatia and Macedonia from the estimates,
claiming that their "conditions render them special cases which require
country-specific explanations". We disagree with this statement,
especially in the light of Croatia's entry of EU accession negotiations.
Thus, we have included in our panel regression the following countries:
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
Also, we were inclined to use same data sources bearing in mind
different methodologies and vast differences, one faces, when comparing
1 See, for example, Euromoney -"County risk analysis" (2000).
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databases of different institutions. The choice of the database was based
on the explanatory variable - FDI flows to countries from the panel,
which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and
financial derivatives associated with various intercompany transactions
between affiliated enterprises, however without items of exceptional
financing such as debt-equity swaps. Having compared the data
provided by the IMF, UNCTAD, WIIW and EBRD, we have decided
that the IMF database offers the best alternative, since EBRD data
diverge significantly from other aforementioned sources, whereas WIIW
data is not unified among countries. Therefore, we only used the
infrastructure proxy form the EBRD "Transition update report 2000".
We proceed in the following way - first we estimate the basic
unbalanced panel model (equation 2). The estimated basic model
containing 12 countries is presented in three ways, employing OLS
estimators, applying cross section weights (CSW), i.e. GLS using the
estimated cross section residual variance and utilising seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR), i.e. GLS using the estimated cross-section
residual covariance matrix. We then continue by splitting the country
sample into CEEC 6 countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia) and other six EEC and Baltic countries
(Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia). The
sample is segregated in order to analyse whether different country




To compute nominal exchange rate volatility (FXV3) we use the
standard deviation inside the annual period of the local currency per
USD. Per capita GDP is calculated by dividing GDP with the population
size (PCGDP). Trade openness (OPN) represents the trade ratio to GDP
(all in nominal terms) and includes exports and imports of goods as well
as services, since banking and insurance FDI account for a significant
amount of foreign investment in the CEEC. The credit rating variable
(RAT2) is defined according to S&P indexes. We take a cardinal
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measure from 1 to 4 to account for different categories which exist, 1
denoting no rating at all, 2 being speculative investment at the lower
band (e.g. BB), 3 speculative investment at the higher band bordering
with lower investment grade (e.g. BBB-), whereas 4 stands for a high
investment grade. Hence, according to the definition, one would expect
a positive relationship between ratings and FDI inflows.
In our analysis we use fixed effects or country-specific effects,5 and by
doing so, we make the plausible assumption of heterogeneity across
countries. Our analysis does not include random effects.
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The results we obtain in our basic model (Table 3.)6 coincide with our
expectations. Current flows of FDI show a positive relationship to one
period lagged FDI flows, indicating that agglomeration does exist in the
area of foreign direct investment. The volatility of nominal exchange
rates exhibits a negative relationship with current FDI flows.7 The
coefficient is robust and significant once we account for
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the panel, using
SUR. Per capita GDP seems to be robust and positively related to FDI
flows. Trade openness is also positively related in our basic model to
FDI flows - however, it has very low significance. Ratings, on average,
are robust and positively related to FDI, and significant when SUR is
applied. This implies, according to the definition of rating variable, that
better ratings attract more FDIs.
5 A brief overview of the panel data models can be found in the Appendix.
6 Table 3 represents summary of the results. Detailed results can be found in Tables
Al to A3 in the Appendix.
7 We have also tried standard deviation of price level measured by CPI as a measure
of price level stability, but this proxy has proven to behave worse than exchange rate
stability. One possible explanation is that foreign investors are primarily concerned
with their return in foreign currency terms, and all those countries had reasonably
low inflation.
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We restrain from interpreting the single elasticities from the estimates
due to the small finite sample properties we are facing, since it might be
the case that the value of coefficients does not converge towards their
true value.
Table 3
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR PANEL OF 12 COUNTRIES
(standard errors in parenthesis)






























































































After obtaining the results from the whole panel, we split the panel into
two subpanels.
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Table 4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR CEE6 COUNTRIES
(standard errors in parenthesis)
OLS GLS (CSW) SUR






































































The results for CEEC6 are very similar to those obtained for the whole
panel, except for ratings that seem to be less important for attracting
FDI into these countries (that are considered more advanced transition
countries than others). The reason lies in the fact that the
aforementioned countries experienced high levels of FDIs during the




EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR OTHER SIX COUNTRIES











































































The results for the other subsumple show again similarities with the
initial results, except that the issue of ratings seems to be more
important as well as trade openness.
How do our results compare with similar work in the field? Bevan and
Estrin (2000) estimated a significant positive relationship between
ratings and direct investment, which coincides with our results. Hence,
sovereign risk, or rather perceived country risk matters. Also, in the
same paper openness seems negatively related with foreign direct
investment flows, although highly insignificant. Olofsdotter (1998)
obtained also a negative relation between openness and FDIs, again
insignificant. Our results regarding openness of markets are mixed and
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therefore inconclusive. Furthermore, the market size measure in Bevan
and Estrin (2000) shows a strong positive relation to FDI the same way
our results seem to indicate.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study tried to identify determinants of foreign direct investment in
CEEC and Baltic countries. An unbalanced panel analysis was applied
to 12 countries for which data is available from 1990 to 1999. The
results seem to indicate that foreign investors, on average, do prefer a
stable exchange rate environment. Also, market size matters implying
that the larger the country (the larger the purchasing power), the more
attractive it is for foreign investors. Sovereign risk is significant in
explaining FDI flows, emphasising the importance of the risk premia
that investors consider. Trade openness did not play a significant role
in our model, and was not robust. So, we do not find, on average, a
straightforward, positive relationship between trade openness and FDI
flows. The results were confirmed on more homogeneous subpanels -
CEEC 6 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Croatia) and other six EEC and Baltic countries (Bulgaria, Romania,
Macedonia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia). For CEEC6 countries it seems
to be the case that ratings play a less important role compared to the
other six EEC countries.
There are several paths one could take in improving the specification of
the model and, hopefully, receive answers with better statistical
properties. One of the possibilities to improve the model is to introduce
quarterly data. This would mean that asymptotic properties would
apply, improving the quality of the estimates. Also, some type of index
should be developed, or a proxy to measure the level of administration
corruption, which should be tested in a transition environment. In order
to improve the statistical properties one could attempt to estimate the
regression using the IV approach, either by taking first differences or
levels as instruments, or the 3SLS approach, and by doing so overcome
the problem of the estimators' biasness and inconsistency.
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Appendix
PANEL DATA ANALYSIS
Panel data analysis is often used when there exist distinct subgroups
within each element of the data set. For instance, when looking at the
data set on families with the distinction of siblings within each family,
when looking at the data on industries with the distinction of firms
within each industry, and especially when looking at the data on
countries (cross section data) during some period (time series data) in
cross-country comparisons. In all those instances a model has
additional indexing:
(A1) Y)t = a + bX)t + u) t,
where j goes from 1 to N and represents number of, say, countries, and
t goes from 1 to T and represents time; Y is the dependent variable; X
is the explanatory variable and u is the error term. Once a panel of data
is employed one gains NxT observations, instead of only N (in
cross-section analysis), or only T (in time series analysis).
Panel data models can further be distinguished according to the way
they can deal with differences that are out of the model (e.g. initial
conditions of each country etc.), but should also be controlled for. There
are two ways of dealing with these issues, which divides panel data
models into two subgroups: fixed effects models and random effects
error components) models.
Fixed effects models assume that there is a difference associated with
each country, like in the case of initial conditions, that does not change
over time (a specific constant for each country). Thus, a fixed effects
panel data model takes the form:
(A2) Yjt = 3j + bXj, + u j t ,
where a} represents specific distinctive feature of each country.
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Random effects (error components) models assume that there is a
random difference associated with each country. Thus, random effects
panel data model can be defined as:
(A3) YJt = a + bXjt + Uj + uk + u j t ,
where the random term is divided into U, or random effects of each
country, uk or random time effects an,d u or random combined
country-time effects.
An additional way of differentiating between various types of panel data
models is the distinction between a one way error component model
and a two way component model. A one way error component model
defines the error term as8
(A4) LI, = (Jj + ̂  ,
where ̂  is time invariant and accounts for any individual effect, which
is not part of the regression and u j t denotes the stochastic part of the
error term. So, for instance, in the case of an earnings equation apart
from explanatory variables such as sex, union membership, education,
to mention some, ^ could be an individual's unobserved ability, e.g.
working skills. In an FDI equation /ij could represent the influence of
the unobserved legal framework. By averaging (A2) and (A4) over time
and subtracting from (A2) one obtains the so called within estimator,
which can be utilised in some cases in order to overcome certain panel
problems.
(A4.1) yjt - YJ = b(xjt - Xj) + (ujt - Uj)
A two-way error component model contains two-way error components
disturbances, which can be shown as:
' We follow here Baltagi (1995).
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(A5) Uj, = Mj + \ + Ujt .
where p,^ represents the time invariant unobservable individual effect
and A t denotes the individual invariant unobservable time effect
accounting for any time-specific effect which is not included in the
regression, while ujt is the stochastic disturbance term. The individual
invariant term can account for time effects, which are common to the
entire pool such as oil crises or, in an FDI framework for CEEC
countries, the change from socialism to capitalism.
As a special case of panel data analysis one could define a dynamic
panel data model. The dynamic relationship is characterised by a lagged
dependent variable, which enters the regression:
(A6) Yit = a + YjM + bXjt + ujt, ujt = Mj + ujt
Assuming that the disturbance term follows a one-way component
model and that both terms of the error term are iid and independent of
each other, dynamic panel analysis contains some basic problems. Since
Yjt is a function of ̂ , Yjt.j is also a function of ̂ }. In other words, there
exists correlation between Y^ and ̂ } with the consequence that the OLS
estimator is biased and inconsistent. The consistency of the fixed effect
within estimator9 depends upon the time span T being large. The same
problem occurs when it is applied to random effects GLS estimators.
Solutions can be seen in applying instrumental variables with or
without first differencing10 using within estimators and applying
dummies for each state and other possible solutions.
9 Obtained by performing the within transformation, eg.: Yjt = a +bXjt + Ujt, u,t =
fij +u j t , then averaging over time, one obtains Y'j = a +X'j + / " - , +
 u'j (loosing the
time subscript). By subtracting both equations we obtain: Yjt - Y', = b(X|t - X'|) +
(u j t- u'j) - as shown in (A4.1)
10 For detailed explanations see Baltagi (1995), pp. 125-148.
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In the paper we apply cross section weights assuming the presence of
cross-section heteroskedasticity. This is undertaken by GLS using
estimated cross-section residual variances. Also, if one intends to correct
for cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation,
then Parks estimator could be a possible solution, i.e. applying feasible
GLS using an estimated cross-section residual covariance matrix.
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DATA & RESULTS
TABLE Al. POOL OF 12, OLS
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:13
Sample(adjusted): 1992 1999
Included observations: 8 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 12
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 80
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TABLE A2. POOL OF 12, GLS (CSW)
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:14
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 12










































































Mean dependent var 8.163428
S.D. dependent var 6.166788





S.E. of regression 0.577968
Durbin-Watson stat 2.207359
Mean dependent var 6.038389
S.D. dependent var 1.470504
Sum squared resid 21.04496
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TABLE A3. POOL OF 12, SUR
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:18
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 12
































































S.E. of regression 0.570577
Durbin-Watson stat 2.466832
Mean dependent var 6.038389
S.D. dependent var 1.470504
Sum squared resid 20.51016
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TABLE A4. POOL OF CEE6, OLS
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:18
Sample(adjusted): 1992 1999
Included observations: 8 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 41







































































TABLE A5. POOL OF CEE6, GLS (CSW)
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:19
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 41


































































0.998068 Mean dependent var 10.43596
0.997424 S.D. dependent var 8.936429






S.E. of regression 0.479650
Durbin-Watson stat 2.165445
Mean dependent var 6.780171
S.D. dependent var 1.268279
Sum squared resid 6.901938
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TABLE A6. POOL OF CEE6, SUR
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:19
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 41





















































S.E. of regression 0.476697
Durbin-Watson stat 2.518373
Mean dependent var 6.780171
S.D. dependent var 1.268279
Sum squared resid 6.817195
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TABLE A7. POOL OF OTHER SIX, OLS
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:20
Sample(adjusted): 1992 1999
Included observations: 8 after adjusting endpoints
Number of cross-sections used: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 39






























































S.E. of regression 0.677676
Log likelihood -33.70280
Durbin-Watson stat 2.285047
Mean dependent var 5.258568
S.D. dependent var 1.258763
Sum squared resid 12.85886
F-statistic 25.77685
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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TABLE A8. POOL OF OTHER SIX, GLS (CSW)
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: GLS (Cross Section Weights)
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:20
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 6












































































S.E. of regression 0.686006
Durbin-Watson stat 2.330853
Mean dependent var 5.258568
S.D. dependent var 1.258763
Sum squared resid 13.17690
58 Broj 87 / 2001.
TABLE A9. POOL OF OTHER SIX, SUR
Dependent Variable: LOG(?FDI)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 07/10/01 Time: 10:21
Sample: 1992 1999
Included observations: 8
Number of cross-sections used: 6
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 39













































S.E. of regression 0.685456
Durbin-Watson stat 2.412116
Mean dependent var 5.258568
S.D. dependent var 1.258763
Sum squared resid 13.15581
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SAZETAK
PANEL ANALIZA DETERMINANT! IZRAVNIH STRANIH
ULAGANJA (FBI) U EUROPSKIM ZEMLJAMA U TRANZICIJI
Ovaj rad analizira odrednice FDI tokova sa stajalista zemlje primatelja,
formiranjem panela 12 zemalja Sredisnje i Istocne Europe, te Baltika.
Rezultati analize pokazuju da FDI tokovi, u prosjeku, idu prema stabilnijem
tecajnom okruzenju, prema zemljama s nizim rizikom, te zemljama s visom
razinom BDP-a po stanovniku. Nadalje, cini se da je aglomeracija FDI-a
vazna odrednica njegovih tekucih tokova. U podacima ne nalazimo potvrdu
da je otvorenost zemlje robusna pa ni signifikantna objasnjavajuca varijabla
tekucih FDI tokova.
